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Abstract: Marya Schechtman has argued that contem-
porary attempts to save Locke’s account of personal 
identity suffer the same faults that are to be found in 
Locke, among which is an inability to capture the role 
our unconscious states play. To avoid these problems, 
she advocates giving up the mainstream Psychological 
View and adopting a narrative account like her ‘Self-
Understanding’ View that, she claims, has the further 
virtue of maintaining important insights from Locke. 
My paper argues that it is misleading to understand the 
Psychological View as sharing Locke’s commitments and 
that (partly as a result) Schechtman has not isolated 
a problem that needs fixing or any reason for going 
narrative. It further argues that the Self-Understanding 
View is a great deal more at odds with Locke’s view 
than Schechtman cares to acknowledge.
Keywords: personal identity, narrative theory, psycho-
logical continuity theory, Locke, Parfit, Schechtman.
There are two currently popular but quite different ways of answering the question of what constitutes personal identity: the 
one is usually called the psychological continuity 
theory (or Psychological View) and the other the 
narrative theory.1 Despite their differences, they do 
both claim to be providing an account—the correct 
account—of what makes someone the same person 
over time. Marya Schechtman has presented an 
important argument in this journal (Schechtman 
2005) for a version of the narrative view (the ‘Self-
Understanding View’) over the psychological one, 
an argument which has received an overwhelm-
ingly positive response from commentators (Gil-
lett 2005; Heinemaa 2005; Phillips 2006). I wish 
to argue that this response is understandable but 
misguided, and that the case Schechtman offered 
is anything but conclusive.
I set out some background to the debate before 
I set out the details of her case against the Psycho-
logical View. One thing this does is to establish the 
need for the argument that Schechtman offers, in 
that a narrative theory like her ‘Self-Understanding 
View’ has no prima facie advantage over its op-
position—it needs to show why the mainstream 
theory does not work before it has some purchase. 
Her strategy is to set up the Psychological View 
as a contemporary attempt to save John Locke’s 
theory of personal identity and to argue that it is 
both too weak and too strong in ways analogous 
to Locke’s theory. Her theory, on the other hand, 
can retain the insights of Locke’s view while 
avoiding its pitfalls. I argue that it is misleading to 
present the Psychological View as sharing Locke’s 
commitments and that (partly as a result) Schecht-
man has not isolated a problem that needs fixing or 
any reason for going narrative. I explain how the 
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Psychological View is quite capable of dealing with 
the problems she raises regarding the importance 
of unconscious states to identity. Finally, I argue 
that Schechtman’s Self-Understanding View is a 
great deal more at odds with Locke’s view than 
she cares to acknowledge and that its points of 
overlap with Locke’s view do not recommend it 
over the Psychological View.
Background: The 
Psychological View and the 
Narrative View
The answer to the question of what makes a 
person the same person over time provided by the 
Psychological View is that it is a (unique) relation 
of psychological continuity. Derek Parfit provides 
the details:
Psychological continuity is the holding of overlapping 
chains of strong connectedness . . . For X and Y to be 
the same person, there must be over every day enough 
direct psychological connections. (1984, 206)
The connections to which he refers are links of 
memory (or, rather, apparent memory), continued 
beliefs, desires, projects, emotions, and so on. It is 
important that such direct links are not required 
over a whole life; they may only be short term. It 
is the continuity that overlapping links provide 
that constitutes someone’s persistence.
The narrative view’s answer is that to be the 
same person is to have a particular self-under-
standing or ‘sense of self.’ This sense of self in-
volves seeing experiences and actions as part of an 
intelligible whole. Sometimes, this is expressed as 
having the capacity to tell a coherent story about 
ourselves—thus the label of ‘narrative.’
We will get on to the differences later; at this 
stage, it is significant to note that the two views 
share a great deal when it comes to the basic con-
cept of person. Both are happy to give a nod to 
Locke’s definition:
Person stands for . . . a thinking, intelligent being that 
has reason and reflection, and can consider itself as 
itself, the same thinking thing, in different times and 
places. (1975, 334)
To be more specific, they agree on (and make a 
great deal of) the following three features, which 
I quote from Anthony Rudd. A person is
a. a temporal being
b. a being possessed of self-consciousness
c. an agent. (2009, 61)
Narrative theorists often suggest that these 
features lead us straight into narrative territory 
and that makes a convenient point to begin the 
discussion.
First Steps Toward Narrative
A common structure can be observed in the 
steps of reasoning from the agreed constraints on 
the concept of person to a narrative theory.2 The 
usual suggestion is that the constraints, once prop-
erly understood, reflect a much richer account than 
a superficial glance might suggest. Along this line, 
Anthony Rudd starts with the notion that persons 
are agents. That means, he says, that they must be 
beings that act for reasons (Rudd 2009, 61). The 
story does not stop there. Following MacIntyre 
(1981, 195), actions need to be understood; intel-
ligible actions are those that can be represented as 
episodes in a narrative.
Something similar applies in the case of the 
self-consciousness condition. Being self-conscious 
involves being aware of myself as acting in a 
certain way to bring about certain results (Rudd 
2009, 62). This awareness also requires under-
standing—making sense of myself, the world, and 
the other people I interact with. All those things 
make sense to me because I can locate them in a 
narrative (2009, 62). “The existence of that self-
conception gives meaning to what I am doing 
now” (2009, 63).
Schechtman follows a similar route from the 
self-consciousness condition. To be self-conscious 
is to have a self-conception. That is not simply a 
matter of thinking of past experiences as yours. A 
person “must see her life as unfolding according 
to an intelligible trajectory, where present states 
follow meaningfully from past ones, and the future 
is anticipated to bear certain predictable relations 
to the past” (Schechtman 2005, 18). The crucial 
difference is that they follow meaningfully—that 
is, in their inherent interconnectedness. The 
self-consciousness essential to personal identity 
requires a sense of a stable self (2005, 19). This 
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involves constant self-monitoring: being “inter-
ested in the character of our experience, and also 
in what we should do and what kind of person 
we should be” (2005, 18). This is only a sketch of 
sort of reasoning involved, but it illustrates both 
the narrative angle and that the case is suggestive 
rather than conclusive.
So we have two answers to the question, ‘What 
constitutes personal identity?’ One says that nar-
rative or self-understanding in narrative terms is 
essential to personal identity and the other says 
that it is not. At some level, the two theories are 
in competition, and so we need to make a deci-
sion against at least one of them (or offer some 
other resolution). What we have seen so far in 
this section seems to be a criticism of the main-
stream view, but it may amount to no more than 
a statement of, and insistence on, an alternative. 
It only represents a serious challenge if the move 
from the shared conditions to narrativity is indeed 
unavoidable, or if there are serious shortcomings 
in the mainstream view that this move will solve. 
Let us consider the first option.
Does Agency Commit Us to 
Narrative Identity?
The question that both theories claim to be 
answering is about personal identity or persis-
tence—the question of what makes me the same 
person over time. Locke’s account of personhood 
that I alluded to, and from which the shared claims 
are taken, arose in that context—discussing the 
different identity conditions for the different sorts 
of things that persist over time. Locke makes the 
point that different kinds of things may have dif-
fering identity conditions—kinds with distinctive 
features may well have distinctive identity condi-
tions. However, it does not follow that all aspects 
of a kind—even all distinctive ones—will feature 
in the relevant identity conditions.
We should accept that persons are agents. They 
do indeed act for reasons, as Rudd suggests, and 
that is what makes them morally significant. That 
means to be a person you must be something that 
is capable of acting for reasons. The difference 
between acting for reasons and merely behaving or 
acting, but not for reasons, is whether or not you 
have a desire and/or belief with content relevant 
to the behavior. There is good reason to believe 
that many of our actions fit into the category of 
acting without a reason. Actions that we under-
take automatically, without any form of prior 
deliberation, still count as actions but allowing 
that they are automatic amounts to ruling out 
a role for reasons in their production. In other 
cases, although the agents may point to supposed 
reasons, there is evidence that those reasons played 
no role in the action. A case in point is the study by 
Nisbett and Ross (1980, 207) in which subjects are 
asked to compare items in terms of their quality. 
The subjects overwhelmingly rate certain items as 
better simply based on their position—the items 
are identical. At the same time, the subjects insist 
that there is no direction bias influencing their 
choice, but only a judgment as to quality. Richard 
Holton suggests that this is a case of a choice—an 
action—preceding judgment; in other words it is 
not an action for a reason. He further suggests that 
this pattern may be a general one in our behavior 
(Holton 2009, 64–8). To insist that such actions 
as well as automatic ones are nevertheless done 
for reasons is to use ‘reasons’ in such a loose way 
as to rob the term of any serious significance. The 
cases I am pointing to are cases in which you do 
not consciously have any relevant belief or desire. 
Your actions may not be autonomous, but they 
are still your actions. And in all these cases, you 
remain a person and the same person.
If we demand acting-for-reasons in a strong 
enough sense to introduce it and narrative as a 
requirement in identity conditions, then an in-
dividual will sometimes be the same person and 
sometimes not, depending on whether or not they 
are acting for reasons. That will also apply to those 
who are sometimes self-deluded and think they are 
acting for reasons when they are not—and that 
is all of us. The simple conceptual requirement 
that persons are agents requires only that they 
sometimes have beliefs and/or desires with content 
relevant to behavior and are able to deliberate 
about their behavior. It is a hopeless enthymeme 
to move straight from that to a narrative account.
Rudd at one stage seems to acknowledge this. 
He accepts that an alternative—say, causal—ac-
count of action (not that I am insisting on one 
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in the argument above) would not lead us from 
agency to narrative. He explains that what he is 
trying to point out is that the narrative account is 
not an arbitrary construction; rather, it has a firm 
place in the hermeneutic approach to understand-
ing people (Rudd 2009, 63). All he has argued, 
then, is that if you follow the hermeneutic ap-
proach, then narrative follows from agency. What 
is missing is the case for following the hermeneutic 
approach in the first place. If narrative theories 
are to establish themselves as the way to go, they 
must offer more than this.
Schechtman does not follow the route of insist-
ing on a conceptual link alone. Before outlining 
the view, she argues that some such view is needed 
because of insurmountable difficulties in the main-
stream Psychological View—difficulties that a shift 
of emphasis to self-understanding will solve.
The Problem That Needs 
Fixing in the Psychological 
View
Schechtman contends that the psychological 
continuity theory is in some ways too weak and 
in other ways too strong to account for what 
constitutes personal identity. She presents it as a 
descendant of Locke’s memory theory (where a 
person retains their identity in virtue of the ‘same 
consciousness’ or—as it is usually understood—as 
being able to remember their experiences), which 
she sees as suffering from these deficits. The psy-
chological continuity theory is meant to remedy 
them, but fails on both counts.
Locke’s memory theory was too weak in that 
simply remembering an experience is not enough 
to make you the person who had that experience. 
If a neurosurgeon were somehow to implant the 
memory of an experience had by her grandmother 
in my brain that would not make me her grand-
mother. On the other hand, it seems obvious that 
we can forget experiences that are ours and that 
remain ours. In denying this, the theory is too 
strong.
The psychological continuity theory (as Schech-
tman presents it) is designed to overcome these 
problems, while starting from the same basic 
insight that persons are essentially self-conscious 
entities. Rather than allowing a single memory 
to constitute identity, the psychological theorist 
contends that there must be ‘enough’ memory 
(and other) connections between people to make 
them the same: some hard to specify quota must 
be reached. They also contend that simply having 
memory experiences will not be enough; those 
experiences must be ‘properly caused’ by the 
original experience.
To overcome the failure of the memory theory 
to provide a necessary criterion for identity, the 
new psychological theory asserts that a few lost 
memories will not matter as long as enough other 
memory connections remain in place. Even so, it 
seems that someone may forget all their memories 
of some past time and yet we would still want to 
say they were their experiences. The psychological 
theorist answers this with the suggestion that it is 
not direct memory connections that are necessary, 
but overlapping chains of memory. As long as these 
are in place, there will be personal identity, even 
though no memories of that past time remain. 
And the connections need not be only memory 
ones; beliefs, desires, values, and so on can also 
contribute to identity.
Despite these modifications, Schechtman argues 
that the new version fends no better than the old. 
Its account remains too weak to constitute identity. 
How will adding more memories help where one 
is not enough? Adding other psychological states 
is no better: “[T]hese give us even less conscious 
access to the past” (Schechtman 2005, 15). Insist-
ing that memory experiences be properly caused 
by the original experience to count as that person’s 
simply reintroduces an aspect that Locke’s account 
was expressly avoiding. Schechtman reminds us 
that Locke was arguing that identity was not a 
matter of sameness of substance in putting forward 
his ‘sameness of consciousness’ account. As far as 
she can see, the psychological theorist’s ‘properly 
caused’ requirement is ultimately no more than 
the demand that the original experience and the 
memory experience occur in the same body. The 
account saves the theory, but at the cost of adding 
sameness of substance—precisely what Locke’s 
account was designed to avoid.
The new psychological account is also in im-
portant respects too strong, according to Schecht-
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man. This emerges in its response to the question 
of which experiences count as mine (just as it did 
with the memory theory). The theory no longer 
demands that we must remember an experience for 
it to be ours. As long as we are connected through 
overlapping psychological chains to a time when 
we were conscious of the experience, it will count 
as ours. That goes some way toward including 
the experiences that contribute to identity, but 
not far enough:
It seems clear, however, that experiences of which we are 
not conscious can be part of our psychological lives. To 
name just two species, dispositional states and repressed 
states seem as if they can contribute to identity every 
bit as much as consciously entertained states, but they 
are ruled out as attributable to the person on this view. 
(Schechtman 2005, 16)
She pushes the point further as well:
There is an important difference between an experience 
that is mine because I experienced it in the past but have 
now forgotten it entirely, and one that is mine because 
I have repressed it and am still suffering the symptoms 
of that repression, and there is no clear way to capture 
this difference in the psychological continuity theory. 
(Schechtman 2005, 16)
On top of this, there may be unconscious states 
that were never conscious experiences that may 
be features of our psychological lives. I pointed to 
the case of someone being self-deluded in Section 
3, and that would count as just such a case. Once 
again, Schechtman’s point is that the Psychological 
View has no means of attributing such states to a 
person (2005, 17).
How the Self-Understanding 
or Narrative View Comes to 
the Rescue
What we need, then, for a theory of what con-
stitutes personal identity is a theory that, first, re-
tains the Lockean insight of the importance of self-
consciousness. Second, it must be able to attribute 
or deny experiences to a person without recourse 
to substances. Third, it must be able to attribute 
certain unconscious experiences to a person and 
to distinguish between experiences that were ours 
but are now ‘dead to us’ and those that we have 
repressed but still play a role in our psychological 
lives. Those are the merits that Schechtman claims 
for her Self-Understanding View.
We have met most of the central claims of the 
theory already, but it is worth seeing how they 
apply in solving the problems of the Psychological 
View. To be a person is to understand yourself as 
a “persisting being in terms of the demands we 
make that our lives be intelligible” (Schechtman 
2005, 20). This means that you follow the events 
of your life, understanding how they fit meaning-
fully together, and concerned that future actions do 
so as well. This tracking will not always be explicit 
or conscious (although that would be ‘worthy 
work’). It is this self-conception that constitutes 
your identity.
The central place in the theory of the sense 
of yourself as persisting retains Locke’s insight 
regarding self-consciousness. Experiences are to 
be attributed to a person according to whether or 
not they see them as their own or whether their 
existence as part of the person’s psychology has 
to be postulated to make sense of that person’s 
course of life. If it is necessary to make a person’s 
life intelligible that we ascribe an unconscious 
experience or desire to her, then that unconscious 
experience or desire is hers. She herself may not 
recognize this, but that does not mean it is not hers 
(2005, 20). And so we have a way of attributing 
experiences without any recourse to substance, 
as well as a way of acknowledging the role of 
unconscious aspects of psychology.
Was There Actually a Problem 
That Needed Fixing?
One concern that the psychological theorist 
might immediately express in the face of Schecht-
man’s challenge is that the theory is set up as an 
immediate descendant of Locke’s memory theory. 
The initial concern may just be that this is inaccu-
rate, but it does also play an important role in the 
challenge, and is worth some attention. Psycho-
logical continuity theories certainly share Locke’s 
account of persons and agree with a great deal of 
what he says. But they rarely occur as responses to 
‘substance’ theories as Locke’s does, and which is 
how Schechtman casts them, holding them to this 
as a commitment. The archetypal psychological 
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account—Derek Parfit’s—is a response to nonre-
ductionist theories of personal identity. Although 
there is some overlap between the set of those and 
the set of substance theories, they are certainly 
not the same. Nor are Parfit’s concerns at all the 
same as Locke’s.
This becomes relevant almost immediately in 
Schechtman’s challenge. She charges that the psy-
chological theory cannot deny that the memory 
of the surgeon’s grandmother’s experience makes 
the recipient the grandmother on the grounds of 
its peculiar causal history. This is because that 
would involve requiring the normal causal history 
between a memory and a person’s experience, 
which is to require that experience and memory 
occur in the same physical substance; and appeal 
to substances is not allowed. Normal causal routes 
will feature in the psychological theory,3 although 
it seems to me more likely that the psychological 
theorist will deny this counterexample on the 
other grounds that Schechtman suggests—it is 
obviously not enough memory to affect identity. 
But anyway, psychological theorists need feel no 
guilt that a particular causal route runs through a 
physical substance. They do not deny that many 
important causal processes will occur in physical 
substances; it is the causal process that is doing 
the work for identity and not that it is in this 
particular substance that it is occurring in that is 
in any way crucial.4
That the psychological theory has a different 
target—nonreductionism—is also relevant to the 
other strand of this part of her challenge. Schech-
tman dismisses any attempt to appeal to more 
than one memory in denying the significance of 
the transplanted one for identity. She comments, 
“there is, of course, a great deal of difficulty in . 
. . finding a non-arbitrary number of connections 
to determine identity” (2005, 12) and repeats this 
comment elsewhere.5 The context of the psycho-
logical theorist’s debate indicates why this is beside 
the point. They are taking on theorists who insist 
that identity is always determinate. The thrust 
of the reductionist (psychological theorist) case 
is that this is not always so. That the difference 
between identity and non-identity can depend 
on an arbitrary number of connections is only to 
be expected, since in the borderline cases where 
this situation arises, the question of identity is an 
empty one in the picture the reductionist is paint-
ing (Parfit 1995, 22). To suggest that this might 
be embarrassing is simply to miss the point, and 
it is an embarrassment the psychological theorist 
should not feel.
The Psychological View not only gets misrep-
resented in its origins, but in its content as well. 
Although Schechtman often suggests an accurate 
version—that what makes you the same person 
over time are overlapping chains of psychological 
connections—she also characterizes the view in a 
different way:
In the finished psychological continuity theory, what 
we have are a collection of ‘persons-at-times’ that are 
cobbled together through memory and other connec-
tions. (2005, 15)
There are some psychological theorists (‘four-
dimensionalists’) whose theory bears some re-
semblance to this characterization. But, although 
even they would object to the details of the 
description, this does not represent anything like 
the mainstream position. The standard psychologi-
cal theorist does not try and reduce a person to 
a conglomeration of person-stages. They reduce 
personal identity to (unique) psychological conti-
nuity that is, in turn, to be understood in terms of 
overlapping psychological connections. Those are 
causal connections between experiences and (ap-
parent) memories, they are continuing beliefs, de-
sires, intentions, and so on that will under certain 
conditions be causally effective with other beliefs, 
desires, and experiences and will sometimes be 
unactivated dispositions. The resulting picture is 
not that unlike Schechtman’s own—except that it 
uses causation as its glue rather than meaning and 
understanding. The self-monitoring that Schecht-
man sees in self-consciousness is indeed crucial 
there, as it is in any form of consciousness, but it 
is a causal process, an internal form of perception 
which is itself a causal process.6
That brings us back to a specific point in 
Schechtman’s criticism. She insists that the psy-
chological continuity view cannot accommodate 
psychological states of which we are not con-
scious—such as dispositional states and repressed 
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states—and insists that these can be integral to 
our identity. But this claim has no foundation 
unless the psychological theorist is committed to 
a very crude account of the workings of psychol-
ogy lodged with Locke in the 17th century. There 
is simply no reason why dispositional states of 
which we are not conscious, or of which we only 
become conscious at specific episodes, will not 
feature as connections making up a continuous 
psychology. They are precisely the sort of causal 
connection that the psychological theorist has in 
mind. A continuing belief is not a picture held up 
continually in consciousness. It is a dispositional 
state. It will be realized in physical form, but—
once again—that is not to commit the theory to 
a disguised substantialism. It could be realized at 
some other time in another substance. Person is 
a functional kind (as conditions b and c on p. 34 
reflect), and psychological theorists have read their 
functionalism in the philosophy of mind.7
Insofar as repressed states are causally effective 
on other psychological states and on behavior, and 
are causally grounded in (probably traumatic) 
experiences, they will also feature in the con-
nections that interest the psychological theorist. 
Indeed, how are they to be better understood than 
as states that affect behavior without the person’s 
being aware of them?
Schechtman’s final criticism of the psychologi-
cal continuity view is that it is unable to capture 
the difference between an experience “that is mine 
because I experienced it in the past but have now 
forgotten it entirely, and one that is mine because 
I have repressed it and am still suffering the symp-
toms of that repression” (2005, 16). And yet the 
difference that the psychological theorist needs is 
there in her own words. The one is dead to us, that 
is, it no longer has any causal traces and cannot 
have any effect on our current experience - it is one 
of which, in Locke’s words, the person “could be 
made to have no consciousness at all” (1975, 347). 
The other is one that can indeed, and continues 
to, have effects—in this case the suffering that 
Schechtman mentions. The difference is a causal 
one: just the sort of difference that has a central 
place in the psychological continuity theory.
First Steps Away From 
Narrative
I have been arguing that Schechtman’s objec-
tions to the psychological continuity theory are 
less than conclusive. I argued earlier that we 
need a convincing case against this view before 
the claims narrative theorists make about links 
between identity and narrative become an issue. 
But even so, it will be worth considering Schecht-
man’s alternative in its own right and whether it 
is up to performing the rescue task she has set for 
it in the light of the discussion so far.
As a way in to this section, we can start with 
the ‘important difference’ that ended the previous 
one. I argued that the Psychological View was well 
placed to distinguish between experiences that 
were ours but are now forgotten and ones that 
are repressed but active, and to accommodate 
both. But it is by no means clear to me that the 
Self-Understanding View copes nearly as well with 
the former category of experience. Its criterion 
for an experience being mine is that it must be 
postulated to make sense of my course of life. If 
an experience is, as she describes it, ‘dead to me,’ 
then it does not sound at all necessary in making 
my life intelligible—but then (on her own terms), 
it does not count as mine, even though she has 
insisted it is.
This (possibly not very serious) point aside, 
you might well be tempted to take up my ear-
lier suggestion that the two theories are not all 
that different. The one will not see the exercise 
of wondering which experiences to ascribe to a 
person as nearly as important as the other does 
(the Psychological View is not that interested in 
what sort of person you are), but in most cases 
they will ascribe the same experiences to the same 
people. The psychological theorist might see the 
narrative theorist as providing an epistemol-
ogy—an account of how we go about ascribing 
experiences to people—whereas their interest is 
in what makes you the same person. However, it 
seems that they need not see themselves as being 
in serious opposition.
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Nevertheless, the claims of opposition remain 
and theorists like Schechtman deny that they are 
just fulfilling this lesser role. And there is indeed a 
serious difference here, and it is at a point where 
Schechtman’s grounding of her discussion in Locke 
might prove uncomfortable for her. Schechtman 
is insistent that persons construct themselves. Her 
claim is not just that self-understanding or a sense 
of self is important or even required for something 
to qualify as a person, but that in self-understand-
ing we construct ourselves as persons—that we 
“determine our identity” (18). One of the crucial 
issues between psychological continuity theories 
and narrative theories is whether or not personal 
identity is this sort of construct. It is worth not-
ing that the issue in the discussion was originally 
expressed as finding out what constitutes personal 
identity, not as finding out how it is constructed. In 
her turn from constitution to construction, Schech-
tman once again finds her inspiration in Locke:
Locke tells us that we make ourselves selves, and so 
determine our identity, by forming self-conscious con-
ceptions of ourselves as persisting subjects. (Schechtman 
2005, 18)
But Locke tells us no such thing. He tells us that, 
to be a person, a thinking being must be able to 
“consider it self as it self, the same thinking thing 
in different times and places” (1975, 334). He 
tells us that a past action of his is “appropriated 
to me now by this self-consciousness” (1975, 
341). But that is a long way from saying that I 
make myself a self. There is no sense in what he 
says of something constructive on the part of the 
thinking being going on—the ‘appropriating’ that 
he mentions just describes a connection, not an 
activity: the action is mine because I am conscious 
of it (being conscious of it makes it appropriate 
to me), not because I appropriate it to myself. It 
may be that we nowadays want to ascribe a greater 
role to ourselves in memory, but that is not what 
is going on in Locke. He does—famously—say 
that ‘person’ is a forensic term; but that means no 
more than that it has special significance in a legal 
context. He elaborates that it, “belongs only to 
intelligent agents capable of a law” (Locke 1975, 
346). Once again, there is no serious claim to be 
found in Locke of a being ‘making itself’ by un-
derstanding itself. When he says “consciousness . . 
. makes the same Person” (Locke 1975, 341), that 
‘makes’ is not used in the sense of ‘constructs’; in 
the context it is clear that it is used in the sense in 
which a soul makes part of a human being—that 
is, as some sort of constituent or requirement. A 
self for him is a persisting thing with distinctive 
conditions of persistence, not identical to a human 
or immaterial substance (1975, 341). This is not 
a construct dependent on our interpretation. He 
may be opposed to substances as the carriers of 
identity, but he still sees persons as independently 
existing things: not substances, but not just con-
structs either.
I insisted earlier that the psychological conti-
nuity theory is not best seen as taking up Locke’s 
project or in sharing his commitments, and its pro-
ponents rarely talk in the terms of substances and 
real essences. But in its presenting an account of 
persons as persisting things that are not constructs, 
at least, the theory does fall in Locke’s tradition. 
That does not make it right and the narrative view 
wrong. But if you think that you as a person are 
a thing whose existence does not depend on how 
others see you, then you might think twice before 
adopting a narrative view, even if Schechtman had 
given you reason to do so.
There is one way in which Schechtman is very 
close to Locke. It does not help her current case 
against the Psychological View, but considering 
it might shed some light on the debate. One of 
Locke’s preoccupations is with personal respon-
sibility. Schechtman points to this, and outlines 
how Locke’s emphasis on consciousness offers an 
explanation of how responsibility ties to identity: 
we can be responsible for actions “because we can 
know them to be our actions” (2005, 16). The 
Psychological View, in extending the range of psy-
chological connections involved and not requiring 
direct memory connections for identity, loses this 
explanation. This forms part of her complaint that 
the theory is too weak: “According to the psycho-
logical continuity theory, however, there are many 
experiences—even whole life phases—that are 
counted as mine even though I no longer have any 
consciousness of them at all” (2005, 16). In this 
way, she says, they lose the appeal of Locke’s view.
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Although Schechtman accepts that Locke’s ex-
planation is incorrect (it is ‘too strong’), she seeks 
to retain an explanatory link between identity and 
responsibility. Her reading of Locke’s requirement 
that a person can “consider it self as it self” in 
terms of “the demands we make that our lives 
be intelligible” (2005, 20) is meant to provide 
that link. The actions that fit meaningfully into 
our lives are ours and that meaningfulness to us 
explains our responsibility for them. In maintain-
ing this explanatory link, Schechtman is close to 
Locke, whereas the psychological continuity view 
has moved away from him. But I do not think this 
favors her Self-Understanding View, nor should it 
be seen as counting against the view she opposes.
As Schechtman points out, on the Psychological 
View there are experiences and actions that are 
mine of which I am not (or am no longer) con-
scious. Because it can offer no explanation of our 
responsibility for such actions, she suggests it fails. 
But it is unclear why this counts as a failing—there 
are many ways in which actions can be ours and 
yet we lack responsibility for them. The automatic 
actions and choices without judgments discussed 
in Section 3 would be examples (as would other 
actions prompted by unconscious mental states). 
What the psychological continuity theory does not 
do is distinguish between autonomous and other 
actions—it marks them all as ours. And that seems 
to me to be correct—there are ways of not being 
responsible for actions that do not rely on non-
identity, and not being autonomous is an obvious 
one. The Psychological View can reasonably deny 
that it needs to offer an explanation of responsi-
bility or non-responsibility in all cases: it is up to 
a theory of autonomy (or a theory that explains 
other vagaries of responsibility) to perform that 
task in many instances.
This raises an interesting point. Much of 
Schechtman’s discussion appeals to intuitions 
about autonomy,8 and it may well be that the 
Self-Understanding View captures a notion of 
autonomy rather than identity: our actions are 
autonomous when they fit meaningfully into our 
lives. Those actions that are forced on us do not. 
Here we can see a connection with Locke. Gideon 
Yaffe has pointed out how closely Locke’s account 
of volition is linked to his account of personal 
identity. To be a volition, for Locke, a mental act 
has to be accompanied by self-conscious awareness 
of the volition itself—the same consciousness that 
“makes personal identity” (Yaffe 2000, 126). It 
may be that both Locke and Schechtman are offer-
ing theories of self-governance rather than the self.
One obstacle to seeing the Self-Understanding 
View as a theory of autonomy is Schechtman’s 
discussion of the place of unconscious states that 
affect our behavior in important ways. In many 
cases, such as that of the shoppers in Section 3, 
we would want to deny that the actions caused 
by such states are autonomous. Yet Schechtman 
wants to find a place for those states and actions 
in her theory. In discussing “the parts of ourselves 
that we are not conscious of,”’ she writes,
Those memories or desires or motivations whose ex-
istence as part of the psychological economy must be 
postulated in order to make sense of a person’s experi-
ence or the course of her life will be considered her 
experiences . . . These experiences still affect us along 
the dimension of pleasure and pain, and are still con-
nected to our capacities for moral agency. (2005, 20)
That seems to bring non-autonomous actions 
within the compass of self-understanding. At the 
same time, it is clear that these actions do not fit 
happily. The actual motivations in question are 
precisely ones that do not fit into the agent’s own 
understanding of herself. Schechtman can only 
include them indirectly—they only enter into the 
demand that my life be intelligible in that “we need 
to allow for the impact of psychological features 
. . . of which we are not conscious” (2005, 20). It 
is only in the understanding of me by others that 
they appear. Schechtman says they are ‘still con-
nected’ to our moral agency, but it is very unclear 
how, and the strong explanatory link between 
identity and responsibility seems to have simply 
disappeared. In more striking cases of abnormal 
psychology, self-understanding will be an even 
worse guide. A happier resolution would be to 
accept that actions under these conditions are not 
autonomous ones and limit self-understanding to 
accounting for autonomy. And that would leave 
the route to an account of personal identity open 
to the psychological continuity theory.
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Notes
1. Of course there are more than two currently 
popular theories—there is also the biological view of 
Olson (1997), the embodied minds view of McMahan 
(2003), and the neuroethical view of Gillett (2008), to 
name but three other worthy contenders. This paper 
is a response to an argument between the two theories 
mentioned, thus the narrowness of my focus.
2. This is certainly true of Rudd and Schechtman, as 
well as other notable narrative theorists like Alasdair 
MacIntyre.
3. Perhaps this should read: ‘should go the causal 
route.’ Parfit says some rather odd things on this matter, 
but Schechtman’s points are enough to show the need 
for a strong causal aspect to the continuity at stake.
4. This particular argument of Schechtman’s mis-
represents Locke as well as the psychological theorist; 
Locke is not opposed to substances doing causal duty 
for consciousness. It is the prince’s soul that takes his 
consciousness into the cobbler’s body. But that it is that 
particular immaterial substance plays no role—as Locke 
goes on to point out.
5. There is another misrepresentation happening 
here. Parfit never suggests an arbitrary stipulation of 
what enough connectedness would be. He writes, “we 
can claim there is enough connectedness if the number 
of direct connections, over any day, is at least half the 
number that hold, over every day, in the lives of nearly 
every actual person” (1984, 206). It is clear from the 
context that he is not offering a necessary condition, 
but simply suggesting that that would be a case that 
was clearly sufficient.
6. I do not mean to imply that perception (or self-
perception) is a simple causal process, only that percep-
tion (on most theories) is to be understood in causal 
terms. There are numerous complexities to perception 
and ways in which other features of our psychological 
makeup affect how we perceive, but those need not 
be ignored by a theory that understands perception in 
causal terms.
7. This is only a commitment to a very broad form of 
functionalism, not any strong reductive form. While say-
ing that, some psychological continuity theorists see a 
closer link here: Nicholas Agar has argued that the view 
can be developed out of common-sense functionalism 
and that this is a preferable route to the usual ground-
ing in thought-experiments (Agar 2003). I take issue 
with him—although not on all of that—in Beck (2011).
8. As it did in her book The Constitution of Selves 
(Schechtman 1996)—see especially the examples in 
Chapter 4.
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